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Effect of the anchoring and 
adjustment heuristic and 
optimism bias in stock market 
forecasts
ABSTRACT
Stock market forecasting is an important and challenging process that 
influences investment decisions. This paper presents an experimental design 
that aims to measure the influence of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic 
and optimism bias in these forecasts. 
The study was conducted using information from the S&P MILA Pacific 
Alliance Select financial index; this was presented to 670 students from the cities 
of Concepción (Chile), Cali (Colombia), and Lima (Peru). Data was collected 
and presented through an instrument that asked participants to make a forecast 
judgment of the said financial index, based on the presented graphics, repre-
senting a year, a month, a week, and the last closing value of the index. Thus, it 
was possible to measure the influence of the anchor and adjustment heuristic in 
order to establish whether the presence of an initial value affected the financial 
forecast. Similarly, the study sought to determine whether the judgment issued 
was biased toward an optimistic or pessimistic position, thereby proving the 
presence of an error or expectation bias, known as optimism bias.
The results were analyzed using the least squares method, and the data 
panel confirmed that  the anchoring and adjustment heuristic influences the 
forecast of the financial index used in the study. Similarly, the presence of 
optimism bias in the cognitive process of forecasting in finance was inferred.
Keywords: Anchor and adjustment heuristic, behavioral finance, finan-
cial forecast, judgment, optimism bias.
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Efecto de la heurística de anclaje y ajuste y el sesgo de 
optimismo en los pronósticos del mercado de valores
RESUMEN
La previsión del mercado de valores es un proceso importante y desafian-
te que influye en las decisiones de inversión. Este artículo presenta un diseño 
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experimental que tiene como objetivo medir la influencia de la heurística de 
anclaje y ajuste y el sesgo de optimismo en los pronósticos del mercado de valores.
 El estudio se realizó utilizando información del índice financiero S&P 
MILA Pacific Alliance Select. Este fue presentado a 670 estudiantes de las ciu-
dades de Concepción (Chile), Cali (Colombia) y Lima (Perú). Los datos fueron 
recopilados y presentados a través de un instrumento que pedía a los participantes 
que hicieran un juicio de pronóstico del dicho índice financiero con base en los 
gráficos presentados, representando un año, un mes, una semana y el último valor 
de cierre del índice. De esta manera, era posible medir la influencia de la heurística 
de anclaje y ajuste para establecer si la presencia de un valor inicial afectaba el 
pronóstico financiero. Además, el estudio buscó determinar si el juicio emitido 
estaba sesgado hacia una posición optimista o pesimista, demostrando así la pre-
sencia de un error o sesgo de expectativa, conocido como sesgo de optimismo.
 Los resultados se analizaron usando el método de mínimos cuadrados, y 
el panel de datos confirmó que la heurística de anclaje y ajuste influye en el pro-
nóstico del índice financiero utilizado en el estudio. Del mismo modo, se infirió la 
presencia de sesgo de optimismo en el proceso cognitivo del pronóstico financiero.
Palabras clave: finanzas conductuales, heurística de anclaje y ajuste, 
juicio, pronóstico financiero, sesgo de optimismo.
Efeito da heurística da ancoragem e do ajustamento e o viés 
de otimismo nas previsões do mercado de valores
RESUMO
A previsão do mercado de valores é um processo importante e desafiador 
que influencia nas decisões de investimento. Este artigo apresenta um desenho 
experimental que tem como objetivo medir a influência da heurística da ancora-
gem e do ajustamento, bem como o viés de otimismo nas previsões do mercado 
de valores. Este estudo foi realizado com base na informação do índice financeiro 
S&P MILA Pacific Alliance Select, o qual foi apresentado a 670 estudantes de 
Concepción (Chile), Cali (Colômbia) e Lima (Peru). Os dados foram reunidos 
e apresentados por meio de um instrumento que pedia aos participantes que 
emitissem um parecer de previsão desse índice financeiro a partir dos gráficos 
apresentados, que representavam um ano, um mês, uma semana e o último valor 
do fechamento do índice. Desse modo, era possível medir a influência da heurís-
tica da ancoragem e do ajustamento para estabelecer se a presença de um valor 
inicial afetava a previsão financeira. Além disso, o estudo pretendeu determinar 
se o parecer emitido continha um viés otimista ou pessimista, o que demonstrou a 
presença de um erro ou viés de expectativa, conhecido como “viés de otimismo”. 
Os resultados foram analisados com o método de mínimos quadrados, e o painel 
de dados confirmou que a heurística da ancoragem e do ajustamento influencia 
na previsão do índice financeiro utilizado no estudo. Assim, inferiu-se a presença 
de viés de otimismo no processo cognitivo da previsão financeira.
Palavras-chave: finanças comportamentais, heurística da ancoragem e 
do ajustamento, julgamento, prognóstico financeiro, viés de otimismo.
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INTRODUCTION
Decision-making in an environment as volatile as 
financial markets implies that investors need to 
choose from thousands of data in order to discover 
the most appropriate one to evaluate and execute 
their decision to buy, sell, or postpone an operation 
concerning a financial asset. This decision is carried 
out through a cognitive process that consists of 
complex mental operations executed with a precise 
purpose: to select an action among several eligible 
options (Cadet & Chasseigne, 2009). This process is 
affected by the presence of heuristics and cognitive 
biases (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In particular, 
the financial decision process has been studied 
from different perspectives that try to describe 
and analyze it, given that it can have an impact on 
financial decisions in world economy. This happens 
because, despite the existing country borders, in 
economic terms, financial markets constitute a great 
independent network. Although this aspect contri-
butes to economic growth, bad financial decisions 
that generate a crisis in a remote country could have 
global repercussions due to the current integration 
of world economic cycles (Ductor & Leiva-Leon, 
2016). Consequently, understanding how an inves-
tor carries out financial decision processes will help 
to better understand market behavior.
In finance, two theoretical corpora have been 
developed, which sometimes complement each 
other and, at other  times, they contradict each 
other. The first is based on the efficient markets 
hypothesis, which assumes that the price of a fi-
nancial asset reflects all the available information 
and financial decisions are made rationally (Fama, 
1997). This theory includes important economic 
concepts, such as the random path of asset prices 
(Working, 1934; Cowles & Jones, 1937; Kendall & 
Hill, 1953), expected utility profit (Von Neumann 
& Morgenstern 1944), the concept of market effi-
ciency and market levels (Fama, 1970), and rational 
expectations  (Lucas, 1978). This corpus of studies 
focuses on decision as a result. 
The second corpus is known as behavioral 
finance, where financial decisions are studied as 
a cognitive process. Behavioral finance combines 
concepts of economics and psychology to study 
financial decisions. One of its basic principles is 
the inability of investors to process all the available 
information due to cognitive limitations (March, 
1978). The theoretical construction of behavioral 
finance involves different concepts, such as the 
model of rational choice behavior (Simon, 1955), 
bounded rationality (Simon, 1972; Kahneman, 
2003), the psychological study of human judgment 
(Slovic, 1972), the influence of heuristics and cog-
nitive biases on judgment (A. Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974), prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979), cumulative prospective theory (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992), market anomalies (Kahneman, 
Knetsch & Thaler, 1991), and behavioral portfolio 
theory (Shefrin & Statman, 2000).
From the perspective of behavioral finan-
ce, the act of financial forecasting is a permanent 
operation of the investor, who, using historical 
information on a financial asset, tries to establish 
the direction of future trends for that asset; thus, a 
judgment is constituted. Judgments are the result 
of cognitively processing the information obtained 
from the environment and establishing how we 
interpret things; this process can be affected by 
heuristics and cognitive biases that result in errors 
of judgment. This paper is based on the behavio-
ral finance theory, which is used to analyze how 
financial forecasting is affected in the presence of 
two cognitive problems, namely the anchoring and 
adjustment heuristic and the optimism bias.
The anchoring and adjustment heuristic 
has a special effect on finances due to the fact that 
investors continually need to make probability jud-
gments, such as establishing forecasts of the future 
value of an asset or deciding whether to acquire 
or sell a financial instrument that has a reference 
value in real time. If an investor is influenced by 
the anchoring and adjustment heuristic, he will 
tend to anchor to the reference value assigned by 
the market to the desired financial instrument. 
When new information about the asset arises, a 
rational investor looks for a way to objectively 
analyze it, studying the fundamental values and 
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then proceeding to forecast or to make a purchase 
or sale decision. Those influenced by this heuristic 
will remain anchored to the initial value and may 
be affected by cognitive biases (Pompian, 2012). 
Studies that analyze the influence of the anchoring 
and adjustment heuristic have come less from the 
field of finance than from other disciplines, and 
are oriented toward results in the capital markets 
of developed countries (Shin & Park, 2018). Far 
more scarce are works that link the anchoring and 
adjustment heuristic and optimism bias as influen-
ces on a financial decision. 
The influence of moderate optimism on de-
cisions has been revalidated as positive by resear-
chers, allowing a better confrontation of uncertainty 
and an active alignment closer to the objectives 
sought (Armor & Taylor, 2002). On the other hand, 
an excess of optimism is understood as an unrealis-
tic or irrational optimism that can be maintained in 
spite of evidence that conditions are not favorable. 
This negatively influences the decision, due to which 
knowledge is overlooked when facing a problem and 
unnecessary risks are taken.
This research seeks to study how the ancho-
ring and adjustment heuristic and optimism bias 
influence the process of developing a financial 
forecast on a Latin American financial index in in-
dividuals from Chile, Colombia, and Peru, and raises 
the following research question: 
How the anchoring and adjustment heuris-
tic and optimism bias influence the forecast of the 
S&P MILA Pacific Alliance Select financial index in 
Colombia, Chile, and Peru?
Regarding the anchoring and adjustment 
heuristic, the last available value corresponding to 
the closing value of the S&P MILA Pacific Alliance 
Select financial index is used to evaluate whether 
the information provided in the instrument influen-
ces the forecast made by 670 participants from 
Colombia, Chile, and Peru. This experiment has the 
characteristic of being exploratory and experimen-
tal and is based on the field of behavioral finance.
To analyze the anchor effect, linear re-
gressions were used to explain the relationships 
between study variables. Also, the study seeks to 
determine whether there is evidence of expectation 
bias, particularly excess of optimism, in participant 
responses, comparing the forecast against the reali-
zed value of the financial index within the designa-
ted time horizons. Optimism was analyzed through 
linear regressions and a data panel using the fixed 
effects model. This procedure was carried out by 
adapting the methodology proposed by Giordani 
and Söderlind (2006) and Kinari (2016). 
The objectives of this research are to measure 
the influence of the anchoring and adjustment heu-
ristic and optimism bias in the forecast of the S&P 
MILA Pacific Alliance Select financial index in Chile, 
Colombia, and Peru. Additionally, it seek to confirm 
the influence of the anchor and adjustment heuristic 
when making a financial forecasting judgment of 
the financial index, as well as the presence of ex-
pectation bias by determining excess of optimism 
in the preparation of a forecast judgment of the 
financial index.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Theoretical foundations of behavioral 
finance 
The theoretical development of behavioral finance 
began with concepts provided by  Herbert Simon 
(1955; 1957), which, contrary to the rational ap-
proach, propose that humans are affected by boun-
ded rationality. This concept establishes that an 
agent, when facing the decision-making process, is 
influenced by non-rational aspects, such as human 
emotions, and shows the cognitive limitation of 
humans to process all the information when making 
a decision. Other limitations studied were bounded 
willpower, which leads the investor to focus on 
short-term results when, perhaps, the optimum is in 
the long term, as well as bounded selfishness, which 
shows how sometimes human beings limit their 
profit in favor of others (Mullainathan & Thaler, 
2000). These limitations on human behavior affect 
the behavior of investors who, at the moment of 
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making a financial investment decision, must eva-
luate multiple variables; this is where errors arise, 
which may lead to a decision not being made in an 
optimal way (Daniel, Hirshleifer & Teoh, 2002).
Behavioral finance is a consolidated field of 
knowledge that studies the behavior of investors 
when they make their financial decisions (Ricciardi 
& Simon, 2000). It is empirical and consists of ob-
serving people and the way they make decisions, 
resorting to multiple logical methods. This beha-
vioral view seriously questions whether markets 
are efficient (Shiller, 2003), and the supposed 
efficiency of financial markets is refuted due to the 
appearance of anomalies, such as financial bubbles, 
which would not occur in a market where decisions 
are made rationally (Schwert, 2003).
The conceptual contributions of researchers 
who have developed the field of behavioral finance 
are very numerous; in particular, those works that 
serve as theoretical foundations stand out. One of 
these is prospect theory proposed by  Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979), who made controlled expe-
riments in laboratory where they observed how 
participants differently perceived gains and losses, 
and especially the importance of the reference point 
to formulate and execute investment decisions. 
They examined the behavior of participants 
concerning aversion to losses, observing propensity 
to avoid risk when the experiment was presented 
within a profit framework and the assumption of 
risk when it was presented within a framework of 
loss (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). They concluded 
that, although the two alternatives are equal in 
terms of reward, the reference point affects deci-
sions because losses are perceived more intensely 
than gains. This form of information analysis is 
known as a framing effect, which is an example of 
cognitive bias (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).
A second concept corresponds to the limits 
of arbitration, which was developed by Barberis 
and Thaler (2003). Arbitration is an outstanding 
strategy from the perspective of an efficient mar-
ket and it is an investment opportunity constantly 
pursued by investors, since it takes advantage of the 
price differential of the same asset in two markets. 
In behavioral finance, there are considered to be 
different limits to this strategy: the most impor-
tant is ignoring the notion that prices reflect all 
available information. On the contrary, deviations 
from the fundamental value of an asset are given by 
operators that are not completely rational. Another 
limitations are high cost, high risk, and difficulties 
to find updated information, finding thus price 
gaps that allow a successful arbitration, which will 
discourage investors from applying the strategy.
A third concept is heuristics and cognitive 
biases. These constitute a large area of behavioral 
finance in terms of research production. They arise 
as a response to understanding the irrationality of 
judgments and financial decisions that, through 
a process of empirical evidence, show why the 
market does not behave efficiently. Its origins are 
explained using decision theory: normative models 
are based on a set of rules and standard axioms 
derived from economy (expected profit theory) 
and mathematics (probability theory), which seek 
to forecast the result of the decisions taken. When 
the outcome of the forecast deviates from reality, 
this is because errors (Newell & Bröder, 2008) or 
“cognitive biases” have been generated. The term 
“cognitive biases” was established by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974), who explained that this is a sys-
tematic error that arises when faced with situations 
of judgment and decision and is due to the cognitive 
limitations of people. Errors are a consequence of 
the use of heuristics. This concept was developed by 
Kahneman and Tversky in their article “Judgment 
under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases” (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1974).
According to these authors, a heuristic is defi-
ned as a mental shortcut and is the result of making 
a decision without having all the information avai-
lable; it is constituted as a tool of our mind, which 
simplifies the problem faced (Kahneman, 2003; 
Caputo, 2014). For some researchers, heuristics 
become an effective tool to process information 
(Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Forbes, Hudson, 
Skerratt & Soufian, 2015), while for others, they 
become a potential variable that generates cognitive 
biases, which lead to error due to the simplification 
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of processes (Tversky & Kahneman 1974; Hilary & 
Hsu, 2011; Hirshleifer, 2015). The conclusions of 
these researchers show how heuristics and biases 
influence the way financial decisions are made with 
the possibility of rendering the decision inefficient 
(Hysenbelli, Rubaltelli & Rumiati, 2013).
In finance, decisions are taken by rational 
and irrational investors, who make different value 
judgments when assigning what should be the price 
of an asset and how arbitration should take place, 
which explains the exchanges of richness between 
the types of investors (Hirshleifer, 2015). Although 
the undervaluation of the price of an asset is not 
always due to erroneous valuations derived from 
cognitive biases—since they are also due to tem-
porary imbalances of supply and demand (Ritter, 
2003)—, biases are inherent in human nature and 
may affect financial decisions.
There are numerous studies on heuristics 
and cognitive biases, although not all are related to 
finances. Some studies have a strong influence on 
judgments and financial decisions affecting transac-
tions and market prices, such as the anchoring and 
adjustment heuristic (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 
1982), cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), 
framing effect (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Levin, 
Schneider & Gaeth, 1998; Ben-David & Hirshleifer, 
2012), aversion to loss (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 
Odean, 1998), mental accounting (Thaler, 1980), 
overreaction in decision making (De Bondt & Thaler, 
1985), overconfidence bias (Griffin & Tversky, 1992; 
Barber & Odean, 2001), status quo (Samuelson & 
Zeckhauser 1988), and optimism bias (Chambers 
& Windschitl, 2004; Sharot, 2011).
A common features to these works is that 
they present a problem of reasoning in their respec-
tive normative answers to participants. Distances 
between the normative answer and participant 
answers were denominated biases. Biases are un-
derstood as the consequence of the use of heuristics 
in the cognitive process of participants (Wilke & 
Mata, 2012) and are divided into two broad catego-
ries (cognitive and emotional), each category with 
a large number of biases that generate errors in 
judgments. Cognitive biases are caused by an error 
in information processing; however, it is possible 
to correct this bad reasoning over time. Emotional 
biases are more difficult to correct; given that they 
are rooted in the psychology of the investor, the 
judgments issued are not based on the processing of 
mental calculations, but intuition (Pompian, 2012).
Although behavioral finance, compared to 
other consolidated fields of knowledge, has not 
been around for long, its evolution has been verti-
ginous, owing its interdisciplinary characteristics to 
contributions from various fields, such as sociology, 
economics, and psychology. In particular, the contri-
butions made in this last field have allowed a better 
understanding of how the process of establishing 
a judgment or a financial decision, as well as the 
cognitive process behind it takes place.
Decision as a cognitive process
Behavioral finance is a set of theories and concepts 
that show how investors perform the process of 
making a judgment or financial decision. Thus, 
the elaboration of judgments is seen as a cognitive 
process that allows the individual to understand 
and recognize things that surround him (Ricciard, 
2008). Locke (1796) states that a trial is defined as 
a mental activity that faces a world of uncertainty, 
where ideas are built to agree or disagree with a 
proposition, which may be true or false, but without 
any evidence to support it (as cited in Pachur & 
Bröder, 2013). 
Judgments and decisions are the results 
of cognitive processing and there are important 
differences between them. As described, a jud-
gment is an idea about the phenomenon that is 
being analyzed and does not imply action. On the 
contrary, a decision is made to follow a course of 
action and, although a trial can be used to carry it 
out because it allows the reduction of uncertainty, a 
decision can also be executed while discarding the 
judgment that was previously elaborated (Einhorn 
& Hogarth, 1981). The mental activity that allows 
elaborating a judgment or making a decision is 
denominated by Krch (2011, p. 627) as a “cognitive 
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process,” defined as “mental representations of 
information that can include attention, perception, 
reasoning, storage and manipulation of memories. 
It is approached as a sequence of ordered stages 
in which sensory input is transformed, processed, 
stored, recovered and used.” The cognitive process 
allows the investor to elaborate a judgment, such 
as establishing a financial forecast, which is the 
presentation of an idea subject to a condition of 
uncertainty. 
Figure 1 shows a diagram adapted from the 
general model of the strategic decision-making 
process proposed by Mintzberg, Raisinghani and 
Theoret (1976), which illustrates how the cogni-
tive process is carried out when a person makes 
a judgment or a decision. It could be summarized 
in three parts: the first is where an individual gets 
information about the environment, the second re-
presents where the complex cognitive process takes 
place, and the third part is where the judgment or 
decision is issued by the individual.
A linear path runs through all three parts of 
the cognitive process; nevertheless, the path will 
hardly be linear. There is a possible interruption 
in each phase due to multiple causes, such as the 
lack of sufficient information or the impossibility of 
advancing to a next phase, which leads to a repro-
cessing between the phases of this procedure. When 
people face a problem, such as the need to make a 
judgment or decision, first, they obtain external 
information from the environment. Once the infor-
mation has been collected, the cognitive process will 
begin with the stage called “identification and de-
velopment,” which is composed of two phases. The 
first one, called “classification,” prioritizes the infor-
mation obtained by level of importance. The data 
considered most relevant will be used in the next 
phase called “primary evaluation,” which is where 
the preparation of the trial or decision begins. Its 
source of information has been defined during the 
previous stage and, here, the type of judgment the 
individual is going to build, analyze, and select, or 
how the decision will be made, is addressed. The 
process to make judgments or decisions is carried 
out by recovering mental representations stored in 
memory, which constitute an additional source of 
information and are used when it is impossible to 
have all the information available to deal with the 
problem. In case of insufficient available data, an 
option is to look for more information. This mecha-
nism of the mind, which allows the elaboration of a 
judgment or a decision, is called a heuristic and its 
Figure 1. 




search for more information reprocess reprocess
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Source: Authors’ elaboration by adapting the general model of the strategic decision process of Mintzberg, Raisinghani 
and Theoret (1976)
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probable effect is the manifestation of a cognitive 
bias in later phases, which leads to errors and will 
be contained in the final judgment or decision. 
The primary evaluation phase can generate 
several judgments or different types of decisions. 
In the “selection” stage, where the “secondary 
evaluation” phase takes place, different trials or 
elections from the previous phase are compared in 
order to select the trial or decision that is the most 
appropriate at the discretion of the individual. If 
there is an option that has a better perspective than 
others, but is not considered adequate, the primary 
evaluation will be reinitiated.
The following stage is that of “analysis,” 
which is the end of the cognitive process. Once 
the judgment or decision has been selected, this 
option is submitted to an “analysis and evaluation” 
phase to establish whether it should be returned to 
a previous phase, or, on the contrary, it should be 
considered true given that the final option fulfills 
the final criterion. It is in this final phase that the 
bias can manifest itself, generating an error in the 
final judgment or decision. Thus, we arrive at the 
third and final part, where the elaborated judgment 
or the course of action decided is made known. A 
better understanding of this complex cognitive pro-
cess makes it possible to know how decisions are 
made and judgments are elaborated, which are fun-
damental events of life that are frequently carried 
out in uncertain situations in both individual and 
collective aspects. Confronting uncertainty requires 
a great effort of the mind to choose the option that, 
among a set of possible actions, leads to the best 
result given one’s preferences (Aguiar, 2004). 
Behavioral finance studies judgment and 
decision-making based on decision theory, which 
considers that a decision or judgment is a mental 
construction resulting from a cognitive process. In 
the analysis of a decision, subjective variables are 
taken into account, allowing for a more realistic 
analysis of human behavior, which results in the de-
termination  that sometimes individuals and groups 
systematically violate the principles of economic 
rationality (Ricciardi, 2008; Hastie & Dawes, 2010). 
Considering the human component of decisions 
that are executed in a financial market, it should 
be recognized that human limitations affect the 
behavior of those markets given that the cognitive 
process is subject to potential problems. 
Cognitive process problems
The cognitive process is composed of a complex 
combination of phases that allows making jud-
gments and decisions. Nevertheless, even if this 
process is carried out conscientiously, it will never 
be free of problems, such as heuristics and cognitive 
biases, since these are inherent elements of human 
nature; each one distributed in multiple categories 
and with the potential to affect financial decisions, 
implying a reason to study the nature of those pro-
blems. In this section, we explain the concepts of 
anchoring and adjustment heuristic and optimism 
bias. These two concepts represent problems in the 
cognitive process that affect decisions and financial 
forecasts.
The heuristics
The great advantage of heuristics is to minimize 
response time to make judgments in conditions of 
uncertainty, since they allow decisions to be made 
thanks to mental shortcuts used by the brain. While 
these are considered efficient because of simple 
mental calculations required when executing them, 
they tend to generate systematic and predictable 
errors (biases). The heuristics that most influence 
the cognitive process are anchoring and adjustment, 
representativeness, and availability, described by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974).
Anchoring and adjustment heuristic
This heuristic occurs when trying to predict the 
future value of a phenomenon. If, before making a 
forecast, we have a reference value of the phenome-
non as a source of data, such as a historical average 
or a present value, that number will influence the 
predicted value. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) 
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concluded that this way of expressing a judgment 
under conditions of uncertainty is affected by large 
and predictable forecast errors, and they called this 
the anchoring and adjustment heuristic. 
This heuristic is defined as a strategy to 
estimate uncertain quantities. First, a starting 
value called an anchor is shown. Then, based on 
the information provided, we seek to find a value 
for the event, which is where the adjustment is 
carried out, evaluating whether it is too high or 
too low and gradually adjusting the estimate by 
“moving it” mentally from the anchor (Kahneman, 
2011). Studies on this heuristic conclude that the 
adjustment process is insufficient because the esti-
mates for the value of the event are conditioned by 
the value of the anchor and do not allow an adequate 
adjustment (Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973, 1974 ; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008; 
Englich & Soder, 2009).
The evidence shows that adjustment is ineffi-
cient because it is interrupted. Once the number in 
the process of adjustment reaches a range of values 
considered acceptable, this range is usually close 
to the anchor (Epley & Gilovich, 2006). Besides, 
it is characterized by being a quick way to make 
judgments and constitutes a potential generator 
of biased responses (Chapman & Johnson, 2002).
Research that seeks to demonstrate the in-
fluence of anchoring and adjustment is varied and 
was conducted in different contexts. Works inclu-
de experiments with questions of general culture 
(Epley & Gilovich, 2001; McElroy &  Dowd, 2007; 
Blankenship, Wegener, Petty, Detweiler-Bedell & 
Macy, 2008), probability of political events (Plous, 
1989; Chapman & Johnson, 1999), marketing 
decisions, (Wansink, Kent & Hoch, 1998; Ariely, 
Loewenstein & Prelec, 2003; Mussweiler, Strack 
& Pfeiffer, 2000), and negotiation (Galinsky & 
Mussweiler, 2001).
In economics and finance, Northcraft and 
Neale (1987) experimented with real estate agents, 
who individually had to analyze a property. From 
a list price assigned by the researchers, the parti-
cipant agents had to estimate the appraised value 
of the property, possible sale value and purchase 
price, and the lowest acceptable offer. The agents 
were divided into two groups; although the alloca-
tion of list prices was different—one higher than 
the other—, both groups responded to the initial 
anchor by placing their forecasts close to the start 
value, which showed the strong influence of this 
heuristic on the forecast judgment.
In the financial field, a research by  Campbell 
and Sharpe (2009) examined the forecasts of the 
monthly publications of various macroeconomic 
projections to verify whether they were anchored to 
previous results. The evidence of the influence of the 
anchoring and adjustment heuristic was significant. 
The forecasts were “anchored” to previous values 
that professionals were forecasting, which could 
affect the stock market as a source of information 
for investors. The researchers concluded that the 
bond market was strongly impacted by these ma-
croeconomic reports.
Another group of research focused on the 
analysis of financial instruments of stock exchanges in 
various parts of the world, seeking to establish the de-
gree of influence of this heuristic in the United States 
(Amir & Ganzach, 1998; Westerhoff, 2003; Cen, Hilary 
& Wei, 2013; Lucey & O’Connor, 2016), Australia 
(Marsden, Veeraraghavan & Ye, 2008), South Korea 
(Shin & Park, 2018), Finland and Sweden (Kaustia, 
Alho & Puttonen, 2008), and Taiwan (Liao, Chou & 
Chiu, 2013). Although these works rely on different 
methodologies and were carried out in different sec-
tors of the financial market, their results converge to 
establish that there is an influence of anchoring and 
adjustment in forecasts and financial decisions.
Cognitive biases
Cognitive biases are brain processing errors that can 
arise when making a judgment or a decision, which 
lead an individual to commit mistakes. They are 
associated with heuristics since they are a potential 
consequence of the mental shortcut performed by 
an individual to solve a problem or situation. This 
section describes how optimism bias could affect 
investors’ forecasts and decisions.
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Optimism bias
Optimism is defined as a tendency to see and jud-
ge things in their most favorable aspect, despite 
lacking evidence to support that tendency. It is a 
personality feature present in the majority of the 
population. In the case of investors, optimism is 
reflected by underestimating the uncertainty of 
economic conditions and considering that their 
investment decisions will be above the average of 
other investors.
Kahneman and Riepe (1998) evoke concepts 
from decision theory to describe this bias. When a 
decision is made, there must be a choice between 
different options whose final result is not known 
with certainty. While probabilities are assigned 
to these decision options and to the decision, the 
beliefs and preferences of the individual are mixed 
in, which can generate errors of judgment, such as 
optimism bias. Optimism bias is a very common 
psychological aspect in investors, where they 
overestimate their knowledge about the market, 
underestimate the risks, and exaggerate their ability 
to control events. This bias is emotional in nature 
and can affect investment decisions since they are 
based on intuition (Pompian, 2012).
Optimism bias has been studied from mul-
tiple disciplines. From the field of neuroscience, 
it is defined as the difference between a person’s 
expectations and the results that follow. In this field, 
experiments have been carried out that confirm 
it as one of the most persistent biases in humans, 
present in about 80% of the population (Sharot, 
2011). In every decision-making process, the im-
portance of anticipating what will happen in the 
future is highlighted. A human characteristic is that 
the anticipation of an event does not engender an 
impartial response from the brain; on the contrary, 
results show that human beings expect positive 
events in the future, even when there is no evidence 
to support such expectations (Sharot, Riccardi, Raio 
& Phelps, 2007; Staněk, 2017). In addition, there is a 
tendency to overestimate the probability of positive 
events and underestimate the probability of negati-
ve events (Shepperd, Carroll, Grace & Terry, 2002).
From a biological point of view, it has been 
demonstrated that an individual with a moderate 
tendency toward optimism bias shows statistically 
higher probabilities of living longer, with better phy-
sical and mental health conditions, and with better 
results than persons with an unbiased forecast. 
Nevertheless, those with an exaggerated tendency 
toward this bias show a propensity for unrealistic 
optimism, which generates a harmful influence in 
decision-making (Sharot, 2011).
Regarding the biological field, moderate 
optimism is an evolutive advantage. Lovallo and 
Kahneman (2003) consider optimism to be be-
neficial in the field of business, which generates 
much more enthusiasm than a realistic or a pessi-
mistic market analysis and allows people to better 
face difficult situations. Errors of judgment in an 
investment decision are due to an exaggerated 
optimism disconnected from reality. Studies about 
human cognition show that investors focus more 
on an internal view of their situation, represented 
by an intuitive and emotional thinking process, 
which leads to overestimating cognitive abilities 
and disregarding external views that could improve 
the accuracy of  the forecast. When an investment 
process has good results, this imbalance of focus 
between internal and external views causes the 
investor to reinforce this inadequate way of making 
decisions, while in the face of a bad result, the in-
vestor will attribute responsibility only to external 
factors (Langer, 1975).
The possession of a small dose of optimism 
is good for business, as confirmed by Puri and 
Robinson (2007), who believe that optimism is a cri-
tical component of economic decision-making. Using 
data from the Survey of Consumer Finances—a sur-
vey sponsored by the Federal Reserve Board and the 
United States Treasury Department—, two types 
of investors were profiled: the moderate optimist 
and the extreme optimist. It was concluded that 
the decision-making process of moderate optimists 
is prudent and optimism helps to balance current 
and future decisions, allowing greater self-control, 
which results in reasonable financial behavior. 
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On the contrary, extreme optimists showed impru-
dent financial habits and behavior.
Predicting the future value of financial assets 
or market conditions is a permanent activity in 
economy. Empirical evidence in psychology shows 
the influence of the optimism bias. When trying to 
make predictions, people tend to assign a higher 
probability to results that they want to obtain and 
not to the realistic evidence derived from a logical 
analysis (Armor & Taylor, 2002). The inaccuracies 
of forecasts are affected by the optimism bias and 
another bias called planning fallacy. This occurs 
when decision-making is excessively or unrealisti-
cally optimistic (Weinstein, 1980), leading to esta-
blishing insufficient completion times for projects 
(Buehler, Griffin & Ross, 1994) or to overestimating 
benefits and underestimating costs (Lovallo & 
Kahneman, 2003). 
Studies on the imprecision of forecasting are 
not limited to studying short time periods allocated 
to carry out projects. In finance, precision in the 
forecast of investors is achieved by getting a ba-
lance between a moderate optimism and realism; 
otherwise, there will be an excessive optimism bias 
or unrealistic optimism (Weinstein, 1980; Jefferson, 
Bortolotti & Kuzmanovic, 2017), which causes that 
investors make an error of judgment, considering 
the personal risk to be less than the risk faced by 
others, when estimating the probability of success 
or failure of their objective (Helweg-Larsen & 
Shepperd, 2001). 
The simultaneous manifestations of other 
biases contribute to increasing the excess of op-
timism in investors. Biases, such as the illusion of 
control, refer to the belief of human beings that they 
are able to control or influence events that are not 
controllable (Thompson, Armstrong & Thomas, 
1998;  Montier, 2013), creating an exaggerated 
sense of control about uncertainty and underesti-
mating the role of unexpected events (Rau, 2011). 
In stock market investors, the illusion of control 
and optimism leads to carrying out transactions 
beyond limits established as prudent, maintaining 
undervalued investment portfolios, and making 
unnecessary acquisitions of risky assets (Pompian, 
2012). A second bias that maximizes optimism is 
the illusion of knowledge, which corresponds to 
the tendency of people to believe that the more 
information collected, the more accurate the fore-
casts. The importance of information lies in how it 
is used and not in how much of it is accumulated 
(Montier, 2013).
In general terms, the optimism bias is an emo-
tional bias that is described as a judgment problem. 
An excess in this bias generates extreme or unrealis-
tic optimism and affects investors’ decision-making, 
especially given the presence of other biases, such 
as the illusion of control and knowledge, which can 
lead investors to consider unattainable profitability 
objectives or make them believe that their skills are 
superior to their average colleagues. Elaborating a 
forecast is based on a complex cognitive process 
that includes several stages, such as obtaining en-
vironmental information, classification, primary 
evaluation—this is where heuristics arise and an 
outline of the judgment or decision is formulated—, 
and, finally, secondary evaluation, where better op-
tions are selected and an analysis of the judgment 
or final decision is carried out—it is in these latter 
stages where biases appear. Behavioral finance 
is a field of multidisciplinary knowledge that has 
demonstrated that these cognitive processes have 
important problems, such as heuristics and biases, 
which can potentially influence judgments and the 
final decision and may be harmful because they 
cause errors. In this paper, two of the most repre-
sentative problems of financial decisions have been 
chosen: the anchoring and adjustment heuristic and 
optimism bias; in the analysis of the results, this 
study seeks to verify the level of influence of these 
problems in financial forecast.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Data were obtained through an instrument applied 
to undergraduate students with previous knowled-
ge of statistics and finance. This allowed partici-
pating students in universities in Chile, Colombia, 
and Peru to be familiar with the type of questions 
included in the instrument. Using the instrument, 
398
Finanz. polit. econ., ISSN 2248-6046, Vol. 11, N.° 2, julio-diciembre,  2019, pp. 389-409
Víctor Alberto Peña • Alina Gómez-Mejía
students had to make a forecast judgment by indi-
cating the future value of a financial index—speci-
fically, the S&P MILA Pacific Alliance Select index—, 
which measures the performance of the 67 largest 
and most liquid companies in Chile, Colombia, Peru, 
and Mexico (S&P Global, 2019). 
The universities that participated in the ex-
periment were: Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, 
Colombia; Universidad de Concepción, Universidad 
del Desarrollo, and Universidad Católica de la 
Santísima Concepción, Chile; and Universidad de 
Lima, Peru. 690 undergraduate students partici-
pated and, after filtering the database, 670 valid 
answers were found.
Table 1. 






















Description of the experiment
The experiment sought to measure the influence of 
the anchoring and adjustment heuristic and opti-
mism bias when elaborating a financial forecast. To 
this end, an instrument was created that presented 
information on the S&P MILA Pacific Alliance Select 
financial index, taking as a reference point the 
current value of the index. The participants were 
asked to answer three questions: first, they had to 
predict the future value one day later, then a week 
later, and, finally, a month later. 
Before applying the instrument, a plan was 
designed to carry out the experiment among 670 
students in five universities in three different cou-
ntries. At each site, a tutor was assigned to conduct 
the experiment among a group of individuals. It 
was established that twenty dates would be nee-
ded to perform this experiment; this is why twenty 
scenarios of the original instrument were created, 
and in each scenario, the closing value of the index 
and three graphs representing its most recent value 
were updated.
The procedure for the experiment was 
applied with the same parameters on each occa-
sion: first, the tutor explained the objectives and 
showed how predictions should be input into the 
instrument. Before starting, each participant read 
an informed consent where the academic purpo-
ses of the activity were specified and they could 
decide whether to accept or decline participation. 
Participants were provided with graphic informa-
tion and they had to use these criteria to prepare a 
forecast of the future values of the S&P MILA Pacific 
Alliance Select index, with three different time ho-
rizons: first, the value projected for the next day, 
for the next week and, finally, for the next month.
Methods of analysis
The applied experiment allowed obtaining diffe-
rent information from participants. Table 2 shows 
a summary of the variables obtained and their 
description. With this information collected, an 
econometric study was conducted to verify the in-
fluence of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic 
and optimism bias when making a financial forecast, 
in particular that of the S&P MILA Pacific Alliance 
Select index. 
The method used to analyze the influence 
of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic was the 
ordinary least squares method (OLS). Equation 1 
represents the model:
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Yi = α + βXi + εi   [1]
where Yi corresponds to the dependent variable 
forecast. This variable was obtained when parti-
cipants, after analyzing the information provided, 
predicted the future value of the financial index with 
time horizons of one day, one week, and one month. 
Xi contains information on the independent varia-
bles, such as the variable index, represented in the 
instrument as the most recent value of the financial 
index. As the experiment was conducted in different 
locations, during different days, the value of this 
variable was always updated to the last closing va-
lue. Other independent variables were country, age, 
and sex, which represent the participant’s country 
of origin, age, and sex. α represented the average 
value of the forecast; β measures the impact of each 
of the variables.
The procedure for the optimism bias analy-
sis was carried out by adopting the procedures of 
Giordani and Söderlind (2006) and Kinari (2016). 
Optimism is defined as an error in expectation, 
obtained from the difference between the forecast 
of the participant and the real value of the index. 
If this difference is on average positive, it would 
indicate that the participant had optimistic beliefs. 
In the experiment performed, the index forecasts 
were made in time horizons separated by a day, 
a week and a month, which allowed organizing a 
data panel using a fixed effects model represented 
in equation 2.
Yi,t  = α + βXi,t + ui,t   [2]
where Yi,t corresponds to the dependent va-
riable forecast of participant i in period t. The inde-
pendent variable Xi,t corresponds to the real value of 
the S&P MILA Pacific Alliance Select index in period 
t. Since the experiment used real index information, 
once the experiment was finished, one month had to 
pass to obtain the actual index values and thus com-
plete the information in the data panel. The value of α 
in equation 2 is assumed to be the average individual 
effect of the participants of the experiment, which is 
interpreted as a state of mind that can displace the 
forecasts above or below the value of the index. The 
certainty to define α optimism or pessimism will be 
given as long as the value of β equals one. ui,t corres-
ponds to the random component.
RESULTS
This section presents the results of the quantitative 
analysis of the database constructed with data ob-
tained from the experiment. The data analysis pro-
cedure was performed using  the STATA software. 
Results of the anchoring and 
adjustment heuristic
Table 3 summarizes the results of the model obtained 
with the regression corrected for heteroscedasticity 
Table 2. 
Study variables to analyze the anchoring and adjustment heuristic and optimism bias
Name var. Type of variable Description
index quantitative Current value of the S&P MILA Pacific Alliance Select index
forecast quantitative Value of the forecasting judgment by the participant
real quantitative Future value of the financial index
age quantitative Participant’s age
sex dichotomic Sex of the participant
country quantitative Origin of the participant
term quantitative Forecast judgment time
Source: Authors' elaboration.
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and with an R-squared result of 0.3517 and a va-
lue of the Akaike information criterion (AIC) of 
24314, noting a strong relationship between the 
dependent variable forecast and the independent 
variable index. The coefficient of the index is very 
close to one, which means that, leaving the rest 
constant, an increase of one point in the value of 
the index increases the value of the forecast by 
one point, which is statistically significant at 1%. 
This conclusion allows us to determine that there 
is evidence that, in the elaboration of a forecasting 
judgment, the presentation of an initial value before 
the elaboration of the judgment influences, through 
an anchor effect, the value of the financial forecast.
Additionally, the results were analyzed by 
country. As a comparison criterion between coun-
tries, Colombia was assigned as a reference country, 
which allowed the analysis of Peru and Chile. In the 
case of Peru, its coefficient is 13.04 with a level of 
statistical significance of 1%, which can be interpre-
ted as follows: if the participant is from Peru and 
not from Colombia, this increases the value of the 
forecast by 13.04 points; in the Chilean case, it in-
creases the forecast by 26.39 points, also with a level 
of significance of 1%. The variable age, significant 
at 5% and with a coefficient of 2.60, implies that an 
increase of one year in age increases the value of the 
forecast by 2.60 points, leaving the rest constant. 
The sex variable was not significant, but its inclu-
sion improved the R-squared value. To be certain 
that the variables of the model were appropriate, 
the Ramsey test was applied, whose null hypothesis 
is that the model does not have important variables 
that have been omitted. Given that its result is Prob 
> F = 0.0606, we did not reject the null hypothesis 
and the variables described are maintained. 
A negative value of the intercept does not 
make economic sense, due to which it is not in-
terpreted; however, it was not removed from the 
model, because without this variable, the R-squared 
was negative. The final equation, which relates the 
dependent variable forecast with the independent 
variables index (anchor), country and age, is:
forecast = –51.13 + 0.9965 index + 13.04 Perú 
+ 22.30 Chile + 2.60 age    [3]
Before obtaining this model, other estima-
tions were made that considered several inde-
pendent variables, but did not achieve a goodness 
of fit better than the presented model, for all the 
R-squared and AIC used.
Results related to optimism bias
Since records were organized with preset time in-
tervals at a day, a week and a month, we opted for 
the use of an econometric data panel model. Table 4 
summarizes the tests performed, their hypotheses, 
and the results used to choose the final model.  
First, the Breusch and Pagan LM test was 
applied to determine whether it would be appro-
priate to use a random effects model or a regression 
Table 3. 
Results of the anchor and adjustment heuristic
Dep. var. Indep. var. Coef. Std. Sig
forecast
index 0.997 0.03 *** Prob > F 0.0000
age 2.603 1.16 ** R-squared 0.3517
sex -4.059 5.13 AIC 24314
Perú 13.042 5.15 *** Ramsey Prob > F 0.0606
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by OLS. The result allowed rejecting the null hy-
pothesis of variance equal to zero of the random 
components, thus defining that the random effect 
model is more appropriate.
Next, a fixed effect regression model was 
applied to verify the null hypothesis that the coeffi-
cients of the dummy variables are equal to zero. The 
result allows rejecting this hypothesis and defining 
that the individual effects are different from zero, 
which establishes that the fixed effect model would 
be more appropriate than OLS.
To define whether the random effects mo-
del or the fixed effects model should be used, the 
Hausman test was run. The result allowed rejection 
of the null hypothesis that the coefficients of both 
models do not differ substantially, thus establishing 
the use of the fixed effects model.
Finally, a first-order serial autocorrelation 
test was performed, using the Wooldridge Test, to 
determine whether the error of a period is corre-
lated with the next period. Since it cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that defines no problems of 
first-order serial autocorrelation order, we proce-
eded to use the fixed-effect model. Table 5 shows 
the results of the fixed effect model corrected for 
heteroscedasticity between the dependent variable 
forecast and the real value of the financial index.
The equation of the model is: 
forecast = 4179.496 + 0.09733 real          [4]
where the result of the test (F) establishes 
that β is different from zero, with a statistical sig-
nificance level of 1%. Table 6 shows the result of 
verifying whether β is equal to 1, which would allow 
an interpretation of the value of α.
Table 6. 
Beta checking
Test Real = 1 Prob > F 0.0000
F(1,   669) = 1213.23 H0: β =1
Source: Authors' calculations.
 A linear hypothesis test was carried out after 
the estimation to determine whether β is equal to 
one. By rejecting the null hypothesis, we consider 
β to be different from one and, for this reason, it 
cannot be established that α, a positive value, is op-
timistic. However, an alternative planned by Kinari 
(2016) to analyze optimism consists of comparing 
Table 4. 
Justification of the model
Models Test Hypothesis Result
OLS vs random effects Breusch and Pagan LM H0: Variance of ui equals 0. Prob > chibar2 = 0.0000
OLS vs fixed effects Fixed effects regression H0: Coefficients of the dummies equals 0. Prob > F = 0.0000
Random effects vs. fixed effects Hausman H0: There are no differences between estimators. Prob > chi2 =  0.0000
First-order serial correlation Wooldridge test H0: There is no first-order autocorrelation. Prob > F = 0.9650
Source: Authors' calculations.
Table 5. 
Results of the fixed effects model
Depend var. Forecast
Indep. var. Coef. Std. err. Significance
real 0.09733 0.026 *** Prob > F 0.0002
_cons 4179.496 120.941 *** H0: β = 0
Source: Authors' calculations.
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the sizes of α to see whether they are incremental 
over time; thus, an analysis was made using OLS, 
separating the historical records into ranges of one 
day, one week, and one month. This information is 
provided in Table 7. 
The result of separating three periods and 
analyzing them individually allows observing that 
the values of α, corresponding to the individual 
effect and referenced as the mood of the partici-
pant, become incremental as the time horizon for 
the forecasting judgment becomes larger, as does 
uncertainty. This result suggests that optimism in-
creases as the time horizon is prolonged; however, 
it is not possible to determine its influence on the 
forecasting process due to an inability to define 
whether it corresponds to a moderate optimism or 
an excess of optimism.
DISCUSSION
This article has described the cognitive process 
behind the development of a forecast and based 
its research objective on establishing whether the 
anchoring and adjustment heuristic and optimism 
bias exert any influence on the forecast of the future 
value of a financial index. 
Regarding the anchoring and adjustment 
heuristic, our results indicate that presenting a 
starting value as the closing price does have an 
influence on the forecast of the future value of the 
index, because that initial value operates as an 
anchor, due to which the forecast has an insufficient 
adjustment and its value remains close to the star-
ting value. This may cause an inefficient forecast 
and confirms that this type of heuristic has a strong 
influence on financial activities, such as establishing 
a future value. This is an important aspect, because 
when investors are aware that this heuristic might 
arise, they could consider analyzing the situation 
better to make more adequate financial forecasts. 
Other studies have reached similar conclusions, 
analyzing how the anchoring and adjustment 
heuristic affects various activities that occur in the 
field of finance, such as the current value of the P/E 
ratio and the future forecast of the dividend yield 
(Fisher & Statman, 2000); the 52-week high price 
as an explanation for the profits from momentum 
investing (George & Hwang, 2004); the closing price 
and 1-day price forecast (Duclos, 2014); the positive 
relation with the current value of the 52-week high 
and post-earnings announcement drift (Shin & Park, 
2018); and the closing price and the valuation of 
ex-dividend shares (Chang, Lin, Luo & Ren, 2019). 
Regarding the influence of optimism bias on 
forecasts, our results are inconclusive, although we 
managed to adapt the methodology of studying op-
timism bias used by Giordani and Söderlind (2006) 
and Kinari (2016) to analyze the data obtained in 
the experiment and organize them into a data panel 
structure. We achieved to infer that there is a pre-
sence of optimism bias in the process of forecasting 
the index to one day, one week, and one month, 
Table 7. 
Comparison of  α  in three time periods
Dep. var. Indep. var. Coef. Std. Sig
1 day forecast
real 1 day 0.697 0.056 *** Prob > F 0.0000
_cons 1409.3 259.49 *** R-squared 0.1619
1 week 
forecast
real 1 week 0.649 0.100 *** Prob > F 0.0000
_cons 1622.2 463.86 *** R-squared 0.0993
1 month 
forecast
real 1 month 0.427 0.029 *** Prob > F 0.0000
_cons 2613.9 135.69 *** R-squared 0.2566
Source: Authors' calculations.
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but without reaching an accurate measurement of 
the degree of influence. 
One of the limitations found in this work was 
the inability to explain precisely the differences in 
the anchoring and adjustment heuristic by country, 
which would have been helpful to know in which 
participating countries this type of heuristics affec-
ted the most. We consider that it was due to an 
unequal number of participants per country, with 
many more participants from Colombia than from 
Peru and Chile. As for optimism, the paper descri-
bed moderate optimism as positive and extreme 
optimism as harmful. It was not possible to ensure 
with total certainty the degree of influence on the 
financial forecast and type of optimism involved. A 
better instrument to capture this type of informa-
tion would be important to define how much this 
bias harms or benefits the financial forecast. 
CONCLUSIONS
The theoretical framework presented a review of 
the scientific literature on behavioral finance; it 
also described how the cognitive process is carried 
out when preparing a forecast, including problems 
that affect it in its different stages, such as heuris-
tics and biases. This review allowed recognizing 
the importance and influence of the anchor and 
adjustment heuristic, proving its influence in the 
experiment performed. With regard to optimism 
bias, the paper described various investigations, 
ranging from a deep-rooted biological explanation 
of the human psyche to its connection to finance, 
since this bias generates important effects on inves-
tors and decisions, both positively and negatively, 
always depending on the intensity of optimism. The 
main contribution of this work consists of a better 
understanding of how a problem of the cognitive 
process, such as the anchoring and adjustment 
heuristic, affects the forecast in financial markets, 
as well as highlighting the importance of optimism 
bias in this type of process.
Future research should include Mexico in 
order to get an overview of all the countries of 
the Latin American Integrated Market (MILA). It 
is also recommended to have a balanced number 
of participants per country in order to achieve a 
more homogeneous sample as well as a country 
characterization. In addition to the anchoring and 
adjustment heuristic, it would be interesting to 
include other types of biases that affect financial 
decisions, such as the herd effect, status quo bias, 
and overconfidence bias. In the case of optimism 
bias, it is necessary to improve the instrument to 
achieve a more efficient measurement of this bias 
when making a financial forecast.
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